The Fear of Domination
The Northern Region is larger in size as well as more populous than all the rest of Nigeria combined; yet Northern politicians have betrayed anxieties over a link-up with the South time and again. For example, in 1953 members of both Houses of the legislature of the Northern Region passed a motion opposing any attempt on the part of the South to fix a date for self-government in 1956.
Speaker after speaker voiced his distress at the North’s backwardness vis-a-vis the South. Northern politicians feared that if they should help to goad the British into leaving Nigeria by agreeing to a motion for self-government in 1956, then they would have to fill the vacated positions in the civil service of the Northern Region with Southerners. This, they feared, would open the way to Southern domination. Hence they preferred to retain British rule until such time as the “Northernization” of their civil service had advanced further.
Thus Abba Habib declared in the House of Assembly that the Southerners “are trying to seize this opportunity to dictate to us their will,” since they realize they have a sizable trained staff for their public services, while the North is “appallingly short of such staff.” And in the Northern House of Chiefs, the Emir of Gwandu declared that the North would not be ready for self-government in 1956 “because Southerners are far ahead of us educationally.”
In 1957 the Northern position on the above had changed somewhat, as indicated by the unanimous vote in the House of Representatives for the March resolution on Nigerian independence. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Northern fears of the South were completely stilled.
Malam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, when announcing the decision of the Northern People’s Congress to support the motion, observed: “Man at times … is by nature suspicious, and it is therefore natural for the people of the North, though greater than the South in numerical strength, to fear domination. (Some Members: No!) I am sorry to say . . . that those fears still exist and they can only be erased from our minds by the most sincere practical demonstration of goodwill and by the unselfish co-operation of the South. (Hear, hear.)”
On the other hand, the people of the Eastern and Western Regions have given clear indications of fearing not only the North but each other. Their fear of the North is primarily a fear of its potential.
Quite obviously the North will come to play a larger and larger role in the life of Nigeria. Its very size and population makes such a prospect seem likely, especially once its people are educated to the point where they can make use of their natural advantages.
Southern leaders see all this and they are looking about anxiously for a means to head off Northern hegemony. Perhaps this means is already at hand, since the 1957 Conference adopted a recommendation which proposed to divide Nigeria into 320 equal electoral districts.
Such a provision would work to the advantage of the Southerners at election time if they were able to win adherents to the Southern-based parties — the N.C.N.C. and the Action Group. However, this revision could also boomerang if the more populous North remained staunchly behind the banners of the Northern People’s Congress.
Another means Southerners have aired time and again for reducing Northern power in the Federation as a whole is to break the Northern Region up into two or more parts.
Of all the plans put forward to create new regions, certainly one of the most ambitious is that of Premier Obafemi Awolowo of the Western Region. He has declared on several occasions that the establishment of thirty or forty regions in the whole of Nigeria is not out of the question in times to come. His professed object is to give even the smallest ethnic group in Nigeria an opportunity to govern itself with respect to its own internal affairs.
Still, it seems probable that such an extreme plan as Premier Awolowo’s would radically alter the power configuration on the Nigerian scene today. His plan would create regions more limited in their scope of activities, and thus the federal government would necessarily emerge from the revision as the strongest political force in Nigerian life.
The very reasons (internal security, for instance) which caused Southern leaders to adopt federalism in the first place are likely to make them shrink from any such strengthening of the central government in the final analysis.
While the people of the West and the East are also wary of possible domination by one another, their mutual suspicion must not be overstressed. The Yorubas and the Ibos will certainly vie, but their clash of interests should not be mistaken for a fundamental antagonism.
Politically, the Yorubas have formed the Action Group in order to close ranks against what they see as aggressive, Ibo influences. The Ibos, in turn, have remained intensely loyal to the N.C.N.C.
The rivalry of these two parties has been bitter — much like the rivalry of brothers. They have campaigned for support in each other’s home bases, where they have gained some adherents, primarily among dissidents and minority groups.
Each party has appealed to tribal loyalties in order to gain victory at election time, and they have not always held themselves back from belaboring acute fears of domination as they have pursued their ends.
It is because these fears continue to be strong that the two parties remain regionalized. However, federalism may act to ease apprehensions in the long run. As this occurs, the Action Group and the N.C.N.C. will be likely to broaden their bases across regional lines even further.
Such a process would spur both the unity and the well-being of Nigeria.
Centre for Nigeria Progress 