
Nigeria’s security crisis has endured for decades, not merely because of operational failures, but due to a chronic reluctance to fully deploy the legal powers already available under the Constitution, statutory law, and international obligations. The result is a paradox: a nation constitutionally empowered to defend itself, yet administratively hesitant to act like it.
If the Federal Government were to finally engage the law with the seriousness the situation demands, here is what a lawful, constitutionally grounded, and institutionally coherent security strategy would look like.
1. Proclamation of a State of Emergency Under Section 305 of the Constitution
The Constitution anticipates disorder—it provides for it.
Section 305 empowers the President to declare a State of Emergency where “there is actual breakdown of public order and safety” or where the Federation is at risk of war or widespread violence.
By any objective measure—terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, insurgency—Nigeria meets and surpasses this threshold.
A lawfully proclaimed State of Emergency would:
Centralise security coordination
Suspend bureaucratic bottlenecks in affected areas
Permit lawful, time-bound extraordinary measures
Trigger National Assembly oversight to ensure legitimacy
It is not a dictatorship. It is a constitutional tool the government has refused to use with fidelity.
2. Withdrawal or Rationalisation of VIP Security Privileges
Contrary to political myth, VIP protection is not a constitutional entitlement.
It is an administrative courtesy that can be reassessed in the interest of national security.
Under the Police Act and the discretion of the Inspector-General of Police, protection details may be reassigned where national security demands it. Reallocating thousands of officers currently serving as private escorts would immediately enhance public policing capacity.
In legal terms: security is a public good, not a private commodity.
3. Expansion of the Armed Forces Under Section 217
Section 217 empowers the National Assembly to legislate the size, structure, and deployment of the Armed Forces.
A lawful expansion to one million active-duty personnel is fully within constitutional bounds, provided:
Funding is appropriated through the Appropriation Act
Recruitment adheres to federal character and merit
Oversight mechanisms under Sections 4 and 88 remain active
Nigeria’s territorial size and threat matrix justify a larger professional force, consistent with international practice among nations facing asymmetrical warfare.
4. Border Closure and Control Under the Customs and Excise Management Act & Immigration Act
Border management is not an emotional appeal—it is a legal regime.
The President, through the relevant agencies, has full statutory authority to:
Close land borders
Restrict entry and exit points
Impose temporary controls on goods and persons
Strengthen customs and immigration surveillance
But the closure must be real, not selective. The law permits uniform enforcement, not cosmetic lockdowns punctured by “informal arrangements.”
5. Establishment of Special Anti-Terrorism Tribunals
Section 6 of the Constitution allows the National Assembly to create courts with specialised jurisdiction.
The Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act already envisages special courts designated for terrorism trials.
Expanding these into dedicated tribunals with:
Accelerated hearing procedures
Witness protection frameworks
Strict evidentiary timelines
Appeals directly to the Court of Appeal
would strengthen the administration of justice while preserving constitutional safeguards.
This is legality—not vengeance.
6. Declaration of Transnational Pursuit Authority Consistent With International Law
Nigeria already participates in multilateral security frameworks under ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN.
It may lawfully declare a policy of transnational pursuit of terrorists, provided such operations comply with:
Host-state consent
International humanitarian law
Treaties ratified under Section 12 of the Constitution
Customary norms governing cross-border operations
This is not extraordinary. France does it in the Sahel. The U.S. does it globally.
Nigeria has the same right—if it is ready to use it.
The Legal Reality: The Tools Already Exist
The irony is striking:
Nigeria does not need new powers; it needs the will to use the ones it already has.
The law permits seriousness.
The Constitution anticipates danger.
The security statutes provide mechanisms.
What is missing is political courage wrapped in legal fidelity.
If the government truly wants Nigerians and the international community to take its security posture seriously, it must stop governing by press statement and start governing by the Constitution.
Until then, the “rule of law” will remain a slogan, and the “state” will continue negotiating its existence


