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When Nigeria set up the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) on April 13, 2003, it was not an act of legislative leisure. It was an emergency response to international isolation. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), created by the G7 in 1989 to coordinate the global fight against money laundering, had placed Nigeria on its list of non-cooperative jurisdictions. The message was blunt: clean up your financial system or face the consequences.

Two decades later, the question is no longer whether the EFCC exists lawfully. It does. The more enduring controversy is whether it can investigate the financial dealings of state governments.

From Rivers to Oyo, governors and commissioners periodically rediscover federalism whenever the EFCC comes knocking.

The Federalism Argument: “States Control Their Own Purse”

Critics of EFCC intervention rely on a familiar constitutional refrain: Nigeria operates a federal structure in which each tier of government manages its own finances under laws enacted by its legislature. Therefore, they argue, only a State House of Assembly can probe how funds appropriated under its Appropriation Law are disbursed.

This line of reasoning was forcefully advanced by former Rivers State Governor Nyesom Wike when the EFCC declared state officials wanted over alleged financial improprieties. Similar arguments surfaced in Oyo State when its Accountant-General faced investigation.

The constitutional provisions often cited include Sections 125–129 (oversight powers of State Houses of Assembly) and Section 128 (investigative powers of state legislatures). The argument proceeds thus: unless the House of Assembly identifies corruption, inefficiency, or waste, a federal agency cannot intrude.

It sounds persuasive—until one distinguishes between legislative oversight and criminal prosecution.

Oversight is political. Prosecution is sovereign.

What the EFCC Act Actually Says

The EFCC (Establishment) Act 2004 does not carve out exceptions for states. Sections 6 and 7 grant the Commission broad powers to:

Investigate any person, corporate body, or organization suspected of economic or financial crimes.

Enforce federal statutes such as the Money Laundering Act and other fraud-related laws.

Investigate unexplained wealth.

Prosecute offenders and pursue asset forfeiture.

The operative phrase is “any person.” It does not read “any person, except if politically elevated or federally inconvenient.”

Section 46 of the Act defines economic and financial crimes in expansive terms—wide enough to cover financial mismanagement at any level of government, provided criminal elements are present.

The Act does not condition EFCC action on prior approval by a State House of Assembly. Nor does it subordinate criminal jurisdiction to political oversight.

What the Supreme Court Has Said

The controversy is not novel. The Supreme Court has addressed it repeatedly.

In A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation, the Court upheld the constitutionality of federal anti-corruption legislation, affirming that the National Assembly could legislate on corruption as a matter affecting the Federation.

Subsequent cases involving former governors—Joshua Dariye, Jolly Nyame, and Orji Uzor Kalu—reinforced a central principle:

The power to prosecute is not determined by ownership of the allegedly stolen property.

In Nyame v. FRN, the Court clarified that criminal offences are offences against the state—not against the specific government entity whose funds were misappropriated. A prosecutor need not “own” the stolen property. What matters is whether a law has been violated and whether the prosecuting authority is empowered under that law.

Justice Sylvester Ngwuta, in Dariye v. FRN, made the point even more plainly: once a federal statute is violated, federal prosecutorial power is engaged. The ownership of the funds—whether federal or state—is immaterial.

This is orthodox criminal law doctrine. Theft from a private company does not require the company to prosecute; the state prosecutes. The same logic applies here.

The Federal High Court Split — and Its Resolution

Some Federal High Court decisions once leaned toward the federalism objection. In cases involving Rivers and Ekiti States, certain judges held that only State Houses of Assembly could investigate state finances.

However, in 2018, Justice Nnamdi Dimgba rejected that reasoning in a suit brought by Benue State. He held that EFCC’s powers under Sections 6 and 7 of its Act are broad and not geographically confined. He emphasized that the constitutional provisions empowering state legislatures to conduct oversight do not exclude federal criminal jurisdiction.

Justice S.K. Idris reached a similar conclusion in Sokoto State’s challenge against both the EFCC and the ICPC, relying squarely on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in A.G. Ondo v. A.G. Federation.

At this stage, the judicial trajectory is unmistakable: anti-corruption statutes enacted by the National Assembly apply across the Federation.

The Doctrinal Bottom Line

The federalism argument conflates two distinct concepts:

Legislative oversight (a political and administrative function).

Criminal investigation and prosecution (a sovereign function).

A State House of Assembly can investigate how appropriated funds are administered. That is internal governance.

But where conduct potentially constitutes money laundering, fraud, criminal breach of trust, or other economic crimes under federal law, prosecutorial competence is triggered. That competence lies with agencies empowered by federal statute—most notably the EFCC.

Federalism does not immunize criminality. It distributes governance; it does not fragment sovereignty.

The Real Issue Is Not Jurisdiction — It Is Politics

The jurisdictional debate surfaces predictably when investigations touch powerful state actors. Rarely does anyone argue that the EFCC lacks power when the accused is a local government chairman or a political opponent.

The legal question, in truth, has largely been settled. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence leaves little ambiguity: ownership of the misappropriated funds does not determine prosecutorial authority.

The EFCC may investigate state finances where there is reasonable suspicion of economic or financial crime.

Whether it does so consistently, professionally, and without partisan coloration is a different debate entirely.

And that is where the conversation properly belongs.

# contentMap.en
When Nigeria set up the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) on April 13, 2003, it was not an act of legislative leisure. It was an emergency response to international isolation. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), created by the G7 in 1989 to coordinate the global fight against money laundering, had placed Nigeria on its list of non-cooperative jurisdictions. The message was blunt: clean up your financial system or face the consequences.

Two decades later, the question is no longer whether the EFCC exists lawfully. It does. The more enduring controversy is whether it can investigate the financial dealings of state governments.

From Rivers to Oyo, governors and commissioners periodically rediscover federalism whenever the EFCC comes knocking.

The Federalism Argument: “States Control Their Own Purse”

Critics of EFCC intervention rely on a familiar constitutional refrain: Nigeria operates a federal structure in which each tier of government manages its own finances under laws enacted by its legislature. Therefore, they argue, only a State House of Assembly can probe how funds appropriated under its Appropriation Law are disbursed.

This line of reasoning was forcefully advanced by former Rivers State Governor Nyesom Wike when the EFCC declared state officials wanted over alleged financial improprieties. Similar arguments surfaced in Oyo State when its Accountant-General faced investigation.

The constitutional provisions often cited include Sections 125–129 (oversight powers of State Houses of Assembly) and Section 128 (investigative powers of state legislatures). The argument proceeds thus: unless the House of Assembly identifies corruption, inefficiency, or waste, a federal agency cannot intrude.

It sounds persuasive—until one distinguishes between legislative oversight and criminal prosecution.

Oversight is political. Prosecution is sovereign.

What the EFCC Act Actually Says

The EFCC (Establishment) Act 2004 does not carve out exceptions for states. Sections 6 and 7 grant the Commission broad powers to:

Investigate any person, corporate body, or organization suspected of economic or financial crimes.

Enforce federal statutes such as the Money Laundering Act and other fraud-related laws.

Investigate unexplained wealth.

Prosecute offenders and pursue asset forfeiture.

The operative phrase is “any person.” It does not read “any person, except if politically elevated or federally inconvenient.”

Section 46 of the Act defines economic and financial crimes in expansive terms—wide enough to cover financial mismanagement at any level of government, provided criminal elements are present.

The Act does not condition EFCC action on prior approval by a State House of Assembly. Nor does it subordinate criminal jurisdiction to political oversight.

What the Supreme Court Has Said

The controversy is not novel. The Supreme Court has addressed it repeatedly.

In A.G. Ondo State v. A.G. Federation, the Court upheld the constitutionality of federal anti-corruption legislation, affirming that the National Assembly could legislate on corruption as a matter affecting the Federation.

Subsequent cases involving former governors—Joshua Dariye, Jolly Nyame, and Orji Uzor Kalu—reinforced a central principle:

The power to prosecute is not determined by ownership of the allegedly stolen property.

In Nyame v. FRN, the Court clarified that criminal offences are offences against the state—not against the specific government entity whose funds were misappropriated. A prosecutor need not “own” the stolen property. What matters is whether a law has been violated and whether the prosecuting authority is empowered under that law.

Justice Sylvester Ngwuta, in Dariye v. FRN, made the point even more plainly: once a federal statute is violated, federal prosecutorial power is engaged. The ownership of the funds—whether federal or state—is immaterial.

This is orthodox criminal law doctrine. Theft from a private company does not require the company to prosecute; the state prosecutes. The same logic applies here.

The Federal High Court Split — and Its Resolution

Some Federal High Court decisions once leaned toward the federalism objection. In cases involving Rivers and Ekiti States, certain judges held that only State Houses of Assembly could investigate state finances.

However, in 2018, Justice Nnamdi Dimgba rejected that reasoning in a suit brought by Benue State. He held that EFCC’s powers under Sections 6 and 7 of its Act are broad and not geographically confined. He emphasized that the constitutional provisions empowering state legislatures to conduct oversight do not exclude federal criminal jurisdiction.

Justice S.K. Idris reached a similar conclusion in Sokoto State’s challenge against both the EFCC and the ICPC, relying squarely on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in A.G. Ondo v. A.G. Federation.

At this stage, the judicial trajectory is unmistakable: anti-corruption statutes enacted by the National Assembly apply across the Federation.

The Doctrinal Bottom Line

The federalism argument conflates two distinct concepts:

Legislative oversight (a political and administrative function).

Criminal investigation and prosecution (a sovereign function).

A State House of Assembly can investigate how appropriated funds are administered. That is internal governance.

But where conduct potentially constitutes money laundering, fraud, criminal breach of trust, or other economic crimes under federal law, prosecutorial competence is triggered. That competence lies with agencies empowered by federal statute—most notably the EFCC.

Federalism does not immunize criminality. It distributes governance; it does not fragment sovereignty.

The Real Issue Is Not Jurisdiction — It Is Politics

The jurisdictional debate surfaces predictably when investigations touch powerful state actors. Rarely does anyone argue that the EFCC lacks power when the accused is a local government chairman or a political opponent.

The legal question, in truth, has largely been settled. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence leaves little ambiguity: ownership of the misappropriated funds does not determine prosecutorial authority.

The EFCC may investigate state finances where there is reasonable suspicion of economic or financial crime.

Whether it does so consistently, professionally, and without partisan coloration is a different debate entirely.

And that is where the conversation properly belongs.

# name
Can the EFCC Probe States’ Financial Dealings? A Federalism Debate That Refuses to Die

# nameMap.en
Can the EFCC Probe States’ Financial Dealings? A Federalism Debate That Refuses to Die

# preview.content
When Nigeria set up the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) on April 13, 2003, it was not an act of legislative leisure. It was an emergency response to international isolation. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), created by the G7 in 1989 to coordinate the global fight against money laundering, had placed Nigeria on its list of non-cooperative jurisdictions. The message was blunt: clean up your financial system or face the consequences.

Two decades later, the question is no […]

# summary
When Nigeria set up the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) on April 13, 2003, it was not an act of legislative leisure. It was an emergency response to international isolation. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), created by the G7 in 1989 to coordinate the global fight against money laundering, had placed Nigeria on its list of non-cooperative jurisdictions. The message was blunt: clean up your financial system or face the consequences.

Two decades later, the question is no […]

# summaryMap.en
When Nigeria set up the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) on April 13, 2003, it was not an act of legislative leisure. It was an emergency response to international isolation. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), created by the G7 in 1989 to coordinate the global fight against money laundering, had placed Nigeria on its list of non-cooperative jurisdictions. The message was blunt: clean up your financial system or face the consequences.

Two decades later, the question is no […]