The framers of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution were many things, but foolishness was not one of them. Having watched the First Republic implode under the weight of ideological prostitution euphemistically called carpet crossing, they set out—quite deliberately—to kill the practice with consequences.
Section 68(1)(g) of the Constitution was the weapon of choice: defect from the party that sponsored you into parliament and you lose your seat, unless your party has genuinely split. Not “split on WhatsApp.” Not “split because my ambition was frustrated.” A real, organic, nationally recognisable division.
Fast-forward to post-2023, and Rivers State has once again been conscripted as Nigeria’s constitutional classroom.
Rivers State and the Post-2023 Judicial Reminder
The Rivers State House of Assembly crisis following the breakdown between Governor Siminalayi Fubara and his political godfather produced a familiar but embarrassing spectacle: legislators elected on one platform publicly aligning elsewhere while clinging desperately to their seats.
This time, however, the courts did not blink.
In a series of post-2023 rulings culminating in firm judicial pronouncements, the courts reaffirmed what had already been settled law since Amaechi v INEC (2007) and Abegunde v Ondo State House of Assembly (2015):
- Party defection without a proven, pre-existing division equals loss of seat.
- Internal disputes, leadership quarrels, or gubernatorial tantrums do not amount to a constitutional “division.”
- Lawmakers cannot defect in practice while remaining loyal in theory. The Constitution is not impressed by verbal gymnastics.
Once again, Rivers reminded us that mandates belong to political parties, not political freelancers.
Yet even as the judiciary did its job, the wider mischief survived untouched.
The Gaping Hole in the Constitution
Here lies the real problem:
Section 68 punishes legislative defection—but leaves the rest of the political ecosystem lawless.
Governors defect mid-tenure and keep power.
Ministers decamp and retain portfolios.
Party leaders cross over in the morning and distribute tickets by afternoon.
The constitutional deterrent stops at the National Assembly door, while political opportunism parties freely in the living room.
The result? A democracy where:
- Parties are temporary shelters, not ideological homes.
- Loyalty is transactional.
- Elections are mere auditions for post-election defection.
Yes, freedom of association exists. But no freedom—constitutional or otherwise—includes the right to commit political fraud without consequences.
A Sharpened Constitutional Reform Proposal
It is time to finish the job the framers started.
Proposed Constitutional Amendment (Substantive, Not Decorative)
- Defection Sanction Extension Clause
Any elected or appointed public officer who defects from the political party that sponsored him shall be barred from:
- Holding any executive, legislative, or party office under the receiving party
- Contesting any primary or general election under the receiving party
until the next general election cycle following the defection.
- Party Administration Cooling-Off Period
A defecting politician may not:
- Serve on party executives
- Influence candidate selection
- Participate in delegate voting
during the subsisting electoral cycle.
- Judicial Certification of “Division”
Claims of party division must be:
- Judicially determined
- Based on evidence of national schism, not state-level convenience
Until such determination, defection attracts automatic sanctions.
- Executive Office Integrity Clause
A governor or executive office holder who defects:
- Retains personal freedom of association
- But forfeits the right to treat the state as transferable party property
The mandate remains frozen to the platform on which it was won.
This does not prohibit defection.
It simply removes the incentive for instant political profit.
Why Rivers Matters Here
Rivers post-2023 has shown us two things:
- The judiciary understands the disease.
- The Constitution has not finished the prescription.
Without extending sanctions beyond legislators, defectors will continue to do what they do best—shop for relevance, migrate toward power, and return ideology to the recycling bin.
Recycling Politicians, Recycling Regimes
This structural failure explains why Nigerian elections feel like reruns.
1999: OBJ—former military ruler with civilian packaging.
2015: Another former military ruler, rebranded as discipline incarnate.
Tomorrow: who knows? Perhaps a nostalgia-driven resurrection tour.
Because our system rewards defection, it strangles the growth of a civilian political class. Military alumni and political godfathers enjoy name recognition and money; everyone else queues behind them like interns hoping for conversion to staff.
Balls grabbed. Hearts follow.
Conclusion: Discipline or Decay
Politics without consequences produces politicians without principles. Rivers State has once again done the nation a favour by dragging constitutional hypocrisy into the courtroom.
The lesson is clear:
If Nigeria wants a real democracy, it must punish opportunism, protect party ideology, and make defection politically expensive.
Otherwise, we should stop pretending, save ourselves the litigation costs, and formally declare what we already practise—a one-party system with multiple logos.
History suggests that it ends badly.
Usually in Rivers first.
Centre for Nigeria Progress 