If the American debate over birthright citizenship reveals anything, it is this: in constitutional democracies, how you do something is often more important than what you are trying to do. Nowhere is this clearer than when you juxtapose the rigid constitutionalism of the United States with the fluid parliamentary sovereignty of the United Kingdom.
The United States: Entrenched Rights, Entrenched Procedure
In the United States, birthright citizenship is not merely policy—it is constitutional doctrine. It is anchored in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, part of the United States Constitution. That placement is decisive.
To alter it requires traversing the Article V amendment process via the United States Congress and the states. There is no alternative pathway. Not political convenience. Not executive creativity. Not judicial elasticity.
This is why any attempt to redefine or restrict birthright citizenship through executive orders is constitutionally defective at inception. It fails not because of its policy content, but because it ignores the procedural architecture that gives constitutional rights their force.
And this is precisely where the role of the Supreme Court of the United States becomes contentious. By entertaining substantive arguments on birthright citizenship without first extinguishing procedurally invalid approaches, the Court risks legitimising a method the Constitution itself forbids.
The United Kingdom: Parliamentary Sovereignty in Action
Contrast this with the United Kingdom, where no single codified constitution exists. Instead, constitutional authority is dispersed across statutes, conventions, and judicial principles. At its core lies one doctrine: Parliament is sovereign.
Under the government of Margaret Thatcher, the United Kingdom fundamentally altered its approach to citizenship through the British Nationality Act 1981.
Before this Act, the UK operated a form of jus soli—citizenship by birth within the territory. The 1981 legislation replaced this with a more restrictive regime, requiring at least one parent to be a citizen or settled resident.
Crucially, this transformation did not require:
- A supermajority
- Ratification by constituent units (as in U.S. states)
- Any special constitutional procedure
It was enacted through ordinary primary legislation, passed by a simple majority in Parliament.
Not even secondary legislation—statutory instruments—was needed. In U.S. terms, this would be akin to Congress passing a standard statute, not even approaching the threshold of a constitutional amendment, yet effecting a fundamental redefinition of citizenship.
Structural Divergence: Rigidity vs. Flexibility
The contrast is stark: Feature United States United Kingdom Constitutional structure Codified, entrenched Uncodified, flexible Sovereignty Constitution supreme Parliament supreme Citizenship basis Constitutional provision Statutory provision Method of change Supermajority + state ratification Simple parliamentary majority
In the U.S., rights are insulated from majoritarian impulses by design. In the UK, rights exist within—and are ultimately subject to—majoritarian legislative authority.
Executive Power: A False Equivalence
This comparison also exposes a critical misunderstanding in the American debate.
Even in the UK’s flexible system, such a profound constitutional shift was made through primary legislation—the highest form of law Parliament can produce. It was not done via executive decree.
In U.S. terms, executive orders are not even equivalent to Acts of Parliament. They are closer to administrative directives—tools for managing the executive branch, not redefining constitutional rights.
So the irony is clear:
- The UK, with no codified constitution, used its strongest lawful instrument (primary legislation) to change citizenship.
- The U.S., with a rigid constitution, is witnessing attempts to use one of its weakest instruments (executive orders) to achieve a similar end.
The Real Lesson
This juxtaposition is not merely academic—it is instructive.
If birthright citizenship is to be revisited in the United States, the constitutional pathway is already known. It is difficult by design, requiring broad national consensus.
The UK model offers no shortcut here. It reflects a fundamentally different constitutional philosophy—one where Parliament can remake the law as it sees fit.
But in the United States, the Constitution is not an inconvenience to be bypassed. It is the process itself.
To ignore that process is not reform. It is rupture.
Centre for Nigeria Progress 