This article has been written in light of the recent statement of the Nigeria Bar Association on the activities of politicians, political parties, lawyers and the judiciary on the matter of litigation of alleged “internal affairs of political parties”
There is a seductive legal maxim often recited with the confidence of scripture: where there is a right, there must be a remedy. In more technical terms, any right or obligation conferred by law is, in principle, justiciable. Courts exist precisely to ventilate grievances and enforce legal duties. Strip that away, and you do not merely weaken the judiciary—you amputate the rule of law itself.
Yet, in Nigeria’s electoral jurisprudence, we are confronted with a curious contradiction. The same legal framework that imposes binding obligations on political parties simultaneously attempts to ring-fence those obligations from judicial scrutiny under the convenient label of “internal affairs.” It is a classic case of the law blowing hot and cold—imposing duties with one hand and withdrawing remedies with the other.
Let us start with first principles.
The Constitutional Foundation: Supremacy and Access to Court
The Nigerian Constitution is unambiguous in its hierarchy. By virtue of Section 1(1) and (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), the Constitution is supreme, and any law inconsistent with its provisions is null and void to the extent of that inconsistency.
Equally critical is Section 6(6)(b), which vests judicial powers in the courts and extends those powers to “all matters between persons, or between government or authority and any person… for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person.”
This provision is the constitutional backbone of justiciability. It does not carve out a safe haven for political parties. It does not say, “except when the dispute is inconvenient” or “unless the matter is internal.” If a civil right or obligation exists, the courts are constitutionally empowered—indeed obligated—to adjudicate.
Further, Section 36(1) guarantees the right to a fair hearing in the determination of civil rights and obligations. Denying a party access to court where such rights are implicated is not merely procedural—it is unconstitutional.
The Electoral Act: Duties Without Remedies?
The Electoral Act 2022 (and its predecessors) imposes clear legal obligations on political parties. Notably:
- Section 84 mandates that political parties must conduct primaries in a democratic manner for the nomination of candidates.
- The Act requires adherence to party constitutions, guidelines, and principles of fairness, transparency, and due process.
These are not aspirational guidelines. They are statutory duties. They create corresponding rights for aspirants and party members—rights to participate, to be treated fairly, and to challenge procedural irregularities.
However, the same legal ecosystem has long been interpreted—sometimes explicitly, sometimes through judicial restraint—to treat “internal party affairs” as non-justiciable. Courts have historically declined jurisdiction in matters deemed internal, particularly pre-primary disputes, except where statutory provisions are directly violated.
This is where the mischief lies.
The Contradiction: Legal Obligation vs. Jurisdictional Immunity
You cannot, as a matter of coherent legal theory, impose enforceable obligations on an entity and simultaneously shield that entity from judicial accountability. That is not law—it is legislative ambivalence.
If political parties are required by statute to conduct fair primaries, then any breach of that duty necessarily engages the civil rights of affected individuals. Once civil rights are implicated, Section 6(6)(b) is triggered. At that point, any statutory attempt—explicit or implied—to oust the jurisdiction of the court becomes constitutionally suspect.
The Supreme Court has, in several decisions, begun to pierce this veil. In cases such as Amaechi v. INEC and Ugwu v. Ararume, the courts recognised that where a political party’s actions intersect with statutory provisions or constitutional rights, the cloak of “internal affairs” offers no protection.
The emerging principle is straightforward:
internal party affairs are only non-justiciable to the extent that they do not infringe on statutory or constitutional rights.
Once they do, they cease to be “internal” in any meaningful legal sense.
The Doctrine of Inconsistency
Returning to the constitutional test under Section 1(3): any provision—whether in the Electoral Act or derived from its interpretation—that purports to bar the court from entertaining disputes arising from the breach of statutory obligations is inconsistent with:
- Section 6(6)(b) (judicial powers),
- Section 36(1) (fair hearing),
- and the broader doctrine of rule of law.
To that extent, such a provision—or more precisely, such an interpretation—is null and void.
The Practical Reality: Political Parties as Public Actors
There is also a conceptual shift that must be acknowledged. Political parties in Nigeria are no longer mere private clubs arguing over who gets the last plate of jollof rice at a convention. They are vehicles for public governance. Their candidates become public office holders. Their internal processes directly determine who governs the state.
Once an entity performs a public function with constitutional implications, its actions attract public law scrutiny. The idea that such an entity can hide behind “internal affairs” is, frankly, an anachronism.
Conclusion: Time to Retire the Fiction
The so-called non-justiciability of internal party affairs is less a legal doctrine and more a convenient fiction—one that has outlived its usefulness. The Constitution does not recognise it. The Electoral Act undermines it by imposing enforceable duties. And judicial precedent is steadily eroding it.
The logical conclusion is unavoidable:
where political parties breach statutory obligations in their internal processes, the courts not only can intervene—they must.
Anything less is an invitation to impunity dressed up in procedural technicality. And in a constitutional democracy, that is a luxury the rule of law cannot afford.
Centre for Nigeria Progress 