Biafra’s War 1967-1970: Al J. Venter and the Mercenary’s Uneasy Conscience by Lawson Akhigbe

I. The Premise

Al J. Venter did not write this book from a library chair. He was there, filing dispatches from the rebel enclave as a reporter who provides first-person accounts of his interactions with Frederick Forsyth, African officials, and the European soldiers and mercenaries who fought in the war. That proximity is the book’s chief asset and its chief liability: Venter writes as a man who watched the thing happen through the smoke of it, not as one who reconstructed it decades later from a filing cabinet in London. The result, by most accounts, is less a tidy narrative history than a series of recollections, personal experiences, and passages lifted from other books on the war, stitched together with the enthusiasm of a man who genuinely cannot stop collecting anecdotes. It is, in short, exactly the kind of history that eyewitnesses write: vivid, occasionally self-regarding, and allergic to a clean thesis.

II. The Mercenary Trade

The mercenaries who drift through Venter’s pages arrived, largely, from the Congo, where the previous decade’s chaos had trained an entire generation of men in the specific skill of fighting other people’s wars for a fee. Western pilots were hired by Lagos, flying the first Soviet MiG-17 jets to see active service in what the publisher rather grandly calls a “Western” war, while on the Biafran side, figures like the German Rolf Steiner, a former French Foreign Legion paratrooper, rose to command the 4th Commando Brigade, and the Welshman David “Taffy” Williams, veteran of the Katangese secession, became a Biafran major so resistant to dying that he was reported killed five separate times before the war ended. Venter’s book, by most reviewers’ account, gives this cast their due: chapters on the Biafran air force, on the mercenaries in federal service, and on the “Air Bridge” that kept both arms and food moving into the enclave. What it also concedes, almost as an aside, is the verdict that these men mattered less to the war’s outcome than their own legends suggested; administrative chaos between the Biafrans and their hired guns meant the mercenaries had comparatively little influence on how the war actually ended.

III. The Racial Calculus

Here is where the book, and the history around it, gets genuinely uncomfortable, and where Venter deserves credit for not looking away. TIME’s own wartime dispatch put the matter bluntly: Biafra accepted mercenary help despite the fact that mercenaries can be narrow, violent men who often harbor a deep contempt for Africans. That single sentence, filed in real time rather than with the tidy hindsight of a memoir, is the crux of the racial question this book cannot avoid. These were, disproportionately, men fresh from Katanga, from a Congo where white mercenary units had spent years enforcing the idea that African armies could not fight without European supervision. Some of them carried that assumption straight into Biafra. And then the war rather rudely corrected them.

Taffy Williams himself is the best evidence of the contradiction. Having commanded African troops in Katanga, he arrived in Biafra apparently expecting more of the same, and instead produced one of the more startling tributes any European mercenary paid to African soldiers in that era: he called his Biafran troops unlike anything he had seen elsewhere, and said men had died in that war who would have won the Victoria Cross in any other context. That is not the language of contempt. It is closer to a man’s prejudice colliding with reality and losing. But admiration for the fighting man is not the same as respect for the cause or the command structure, and Steiner’s own recorded scorn, comparing Biafran military failures unfavourably to what a Foreign Legion corporal would achieve with the same equipment, shows the other half of the ledger: paternalism dressed as professionalism, the mercenary’s habit of blaming the African officer corps for problems that were, more often, problems of ammunition, starvation, and blockade. South African involvement adds its own layer of irony that the book, to its credit, does not dodge: apartheid’s citizens fighting, for money, on African soil, in a war whose central atrocity was the mass starvation of Black civilians, at the invitation of a Black government they would not have permitted to vote in their own.

IV. Verdict

This is not a polished single narrative, and readers hoping for one will find themselves refighting the same battles from three angles by chapter six. But as a document of what it actually felt like to watch white mercenaries stumble, sometimes honourably and sometimes disgracefully, through Africa’s first great post-colonial catastrophe, Venter’s book earns its recommendation. It is dense, well illustrated, and unsentimental about a subject that invites sentimentality from every direction. Read it less for the military chronology, which you can get elsewhere, and more for the discomfort it refuses to resolve.

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