The Sky Becomes a Minefield: How Drone Swarms Are Ending the Age of Air Superiority by Gandalv

NN reports that the pilot of a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle, shot down over Iran in April, described a sight that immediately triggered debate inside the U.S. Intelligence Community: multiple Iranian drones in the air, apparently interconnected or coordinated, moving as one. One source described larger drones with smaller drones beneath them, “like legs.” Another described it as a “minefield of drones” in the sky.

Boko Haram Ransom Tactics: A Multi-Faceted Comparison in the Context of Nigeria’s “Starve the Beast” Dilemma

Boko Haram’s kidnapping-for-ransom (KfR) tactics exemplify the shift Lawson Akhigbe describes in his April 2026 article: modern Nigerian insurgencies as “grotesque startups” where cash flow, not conviction, sustains the beast. What began as opportunistic grabs for foreign hostages evolved into a sophisticated, multi-purpose revenue engine intertwined with ideology, propaganda, recruitment, and psychological warfare. Yet factional splits, territorial losses, and competition with purely criminal bandits have diversified and, in some ways, industrialized these tactics. This analysis compares Boko Haram’s (Jama’atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da’awati wal-Jihad, or JAS, under Abubakar Shekau’s legacy) approaches to its ISWAP splinter, to northwestern bandits, and to historical/contemporary parallels (FARC, Somali pirates, AQIM). It draws on evolution, methods, motivations, outcomes, and policy implications—highlighting nuances like gendered violence, government complicity, and the high human cost of “starve the beast” strategies.

The Law Is a Blunt Instrument by Lawson Akhigbe

In the fearful months and years following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Western democracies faced an unenviable dilemma. Their citizens demanded protection from an enemy that recognised no borders, wore no uniforms and deliberately targeted civilians.

IS Responds to Military Pressure in Nigeria

Despite Nigeria's assessment, the emerging consensus was that Lakurawa was not a unified entity but rather an umbrella term, and that attacks attributed to the group were likely perpetrated by a mix of Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). JNIM, bandits. and potentially a separate new group operating under the label without claiming responsibility.

When Tactical Brilliance Meets Strategic Confusion: Washington’s Iran Problem by Lawson Akhigbe

But wars are not graded like Olympic gymnastics. There are no medals for technical execution if the end result leaves your opponent intact, emboldened, or—worse—adapted.